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authormadmaxoft@gmail.com <madmaxoft@gmail.com@0a769ca7-a7f5-676a-18bf-c427514a06d6>2012-08-30 23:06:13 +0200
committermadmaxoft@gmail.com <madmaxoft@gmail.com@0a769ca7-a7f5-676a-18bf-c427514a06d6>2012-08-30 23:06:13 +0200
commit539364846a89987ac2679988653f50332cb91d26 (patch)
treef1695473c1f493a19c5fbdb70f7f1faccf99d7f3 /CryptoPP/pubkey.cpp
parentUpdated to V6 - "Stop" and "Progress report" functionality (diff)
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Diffstat (limited to 'CryptoPP/pubkey.cpp')
-rw-r--r--CryptoPP/pubkey.cpp165
1 files changed, 165 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/CryptoPP/pubkey.cpp b/CryptoPP/pubkey.cpp
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+// pubkey.cpp - written and placed in the public domain by Wei Dai
+
+#include "pch.h"
+
+#ifndef CRYPTOPP_IMPORTS
+
+#include "pubkey.h"
+
+NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP)
+
+void P1363_MGF1KDF2_Common(HashTransformation &hash, byte *output, size_t outputLength, const byte *input, size_t inputLength, const byte *derivationParams, size_t derivationParamsLength, bool mask, unsigned int counterStart)
+{
+ ArraySink *sink;
+ HashFilter filter(hash, sink = mask ? new ArrayXorSink(output, outputLength) : new ArraySink(output, outputLength));
+ word32 counter = counterStart;
+ while (sink->AvailableSize() > 0)
+ {
+ filter.Put(input, inputLength);
+ filter.PutWord32(counter++);
+ filter.Put(derivationParams, derivationParamsLength);
+ filter.MessageEnd();
+ }
+}
+
+bool PK_DeterministicSignatureMessageEncodingMethod::VerifyMessageRepresentative(
+ HashTransformation &hash, HashIdentifier hashIdentifier, bool messageEmpty,
+ byte *representative, size_t representativeBitLength) const
+{
+ SecByteBlock computedRepresentative(BitsToBytes(representativeBitLength));
+ ComputeMessageRepresentative(NullRNG(), NULL, 0, hash, hashIdentifier, messageEmpty, computedRepresentative, representativeBitLength);
+ return VerifyBufsEqual(representative, computedRepresentative, computedRepresentative.size());
+}
+
+bool PK_RecoverableSignatureMessageEncodingMethod::VerifyMessageRepresentative(
+ HashTransformation &hash, HashIdentifier hashIdentifier, bool messageEmpty,
+ byte *representative, size_t representativeBitLength) const
+{
+ SecByteBlock recoveredMessage(MaxRecoverableLength(representativeBitLength, hashIdentifier.second, hash.DigestSize()));
+ DecodingResult result = RecoverMessageFromRepresentative(
+ hash, hashIdentifier, messageEmpty, representative, representativeBitLength, recoveredMessage);
+ return result.isValidCoding && result.messageLength == 0;
+}
+
+void TF_SignerBase::InputRecoverableMessage(PK_MessageAccumulator &messageAccumulator, const byte *recoverableMessage, size_t recoverableMessageLength) const
+{
+ PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &ma = static_cast<PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &>(messageAccumulator);
+ HashIdentifier id = GetHashIdentifier();
+ const MessageEncodingInterface &encoding = GetMessageEncodingInterface();
+
+ if (MessageRepresentativeBitLength() < encoding.MinRepresentativeBitLength(id.second, ma.AccessHash().DigestSize()))
+ throw PK_SignatureScheme::KeyTooShort();
+
+ size_t maxRecoverableLength = encoding.MaxRecoverableLength(MessageRepresentativeBitLength(), GetHashIdentifier().second, ma.AccessHash().DigestSize());
+
+ if (maxRecoverableLength == 0)
+ {throw NotImplemented("TF_SignerBase: this algorithm does not support messsage recovery or the key is too short");}
+ if (recoverableMessageLength > maxRecoverableLength)
+ throw InvalidArgument("TF_SignerBase: the recoverable message part is too long for the given key and algorithm");
+
+ ma.m_recoverableMessage.Assign(recoverableMessage, recoverableMessageLength);
+ encoding.ProcessRecoverableMessage(
+ ma.AccessHash(),
+ recoverableMessage, recoverableMessageLength,
+ NULL, 0, ma.m_semisignature);
+}
+
+size_t TF_SignerBase::SignAndRestart(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, PK_MessageAccumulator &messageAccumulator, byte *signature, bool restart) const
+{
+ PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &ma = static_cast<PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &>(messageAccumulator);
+ HashIdentifier id = GetHashIdentifier();
+ const MessageEncodingInterface &encoding = GetMessageEncodingInterface();
+
+ if (MessageRepresentativeBitLength() < encoding.MinRepresentativeBitLength(id.second, ma.AccessHash().DigestSize()))
+ throw PK_SignatureScheme::KeyTooShort();
+
+ SecByteBlock representative(MessageRepresentativeLength());
+ encoding.ComputeMessageRepresentative(rng,
+ ma.m_recoverableMessage, ma.m_recoverableMessage.size(),
+ ma.AccessHash(), id, ma.m_empty,
+ representative, MessageRepresentativeBitLength());
+ ma.m_empty = true;
+
+ Integer r(representative, representative.size());
+ size_t signatureLength = SignatureLength();
+ GetTrapdoorFunctionInterface().CalculateRandomizedInverse(rng, r).Encode(signature, signatureLength);
+ return signatureLength;
+}
+
+void TF_VerifierBase::InputSignature(PK_MessageAccumulator &messageAccumulator, const byte *signature, size_t signatureLength) const
+{
+ PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &ma = static_cast<PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &>(messageAccumulator);
+ HashIdentifier id = GetHashIdentifier();
+ const MessageEncodingInterface &encoding = GetMessageEncodingInterface();
+
+ if (MessageRepresentativeBitLength() < encoding.MinRepresentativeBitLength(id.second, ma.AccessHash().DigestSize()))
+ throw PK_SignatureScheme::KeyTooShort();
+
+ ma.m_representative.New(MessageRepresentativeLength());
+ Integer x = GetTrapdoorFunctionInterface().ApplyFunction(Integer(signature, signatureLength));
+ if (x.BitCount() > MessageRepresentativeBitLength())
+ x = Integer::Zero(); // don't return false here to prevent timing attack
+ x.Encode(ma.m_representative, ma.m_representative.size());
+}
+
+bool TF_VerifierBase::VerifyAndRestart(PK_MessageAccumulator &messageAccumulator) const
+{
+ PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &ma = static_cast<PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &>(messageAccumulator);
+ HashIdentifier id = GetHashIdentifier();
+ const MessageEncodingInterface &encoding = GetMessageEncodingInterface();
+
+ if (MessageRepresentativeBitLength() < encoding.MinRepresentativeBitLength(id.second, ma.AccessHash().DigestSize()))
+ throw PK_SignatureScheme::KeyTooShort();
+
+ bool result = encoding.VerifyMessageRepresentative(
+ ma.AccessHash(), id, ma.m_empty, ma.m_representative, MessageRepresentativeBitLength());
+ ma.m_empty = true;
+ return result;
+}
+
+DecodingResult TF_VerifierBase::RecoverAndRestart(byte *recoveredMessage, PK_MessageAccumulator &messageAccumulator) const
+{
+ PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &ma = static_cast<PK_MessageAccumulatorBase &>(messageAccumulator);
+ HashIdentifier id = GetHashIdentifier();
+ const MessageEncodingInterface &encoding = GetMessageEncodingInterface();
+
+ if (MessageRepresentativeBitLength() < encoding.MinRepresentativeBitLength(id.second, ma.AccessHash().DigestSize()))
+ throw PK_SignatureScheme::KeyTooShort();
+
+ DecodingResult result = encoding.RecoverMessageFromRepresentative(
+ ma.AccessHash(), id, ma.m_empty, ma.m_representative, MessageRepresentativeBitLength(), recoveredMessage);
+ ma.m_empty = true;
+ return result;
+}
+
+DecodingResult TF_DecryptorBase::Decrypt(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextLength, byte *plaintext, const NameValuePairs &parameters) const
+{
+ if (ciphertextLength != FixedCiphertextLength())
+ throw InvalidArgument(AlgorithmName() + ": ciphertext length of " + IntToString(ciphertextLength) + " doesn't match the required length of " + IntToString(FixedCiphertextLength()) + " for this key");
+
+ SecByteBlock paddedBlock(PaddedBlockByteLength());
+ Integer x = GetTrapdoorFunctionInterface().CalculateInverse(rng, Integer(ciphertext, ciphertextLength));
+ if (x.ByteCount() > paddedBlock.size())
+ x = Integer::Zero(); // don't return false here to prevent timing attack
+ x.Encode(paddedBlock, paddedBlock.size());
+ return GetMessageEncodingInterface().Unpad(paddedBlock, PaddedBlockBitLength(), plaintext, parameters);
+}
+
+void TF_EncryptorBase::Encrypt(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *plaintext, size_t plaintextLength, byte *ciphertext, const NameValuePairs &parameters) const
+{
+ if (plaintextLength > FixedMaxPlaintextLength())
+ {
+ if (FixedMaxPlaintextLength() < 1)
+ throw InvalidArgument(AlgorithmName() + ": this key is too short to encrypt any messages");
+ else
+ throw InvalidArgument(AlgorithmName() + ": message length of " + IntToString(plaintextLength) + " exceeds the maximum of " + IntToString(FixedMaxPlaintextLength()) + " for this public key");
+ }
+
+ SecByteBlock paddedBlock(PaddedBlockByteLength());
+ GetMessageEncodingInterface().Pad(rng, plaintext, plaintextLength, paddedBlock, PaddedBlockBitLength(), parameters);
+ GetTrapdoorFunctionInterface().ApplyRandomizedFunction(rng, Integer(paddedBlock, paddedBlock.size())).Encode(ciphertext, FixedCiphertextLength());
+}
+
+NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif